Who is afraid of hegelian wolves




















One can see that when becoming is subordinated to the logic ofthe genus in this way, it remains inseparable from the destiny of the family. Litle by litle Freud redirects the errant wolves along the sure path of generic union, thus guarentecing the role ofthe parents and the sound functioning ofthe reproductive process. A passage from A Thousand Plateaus ts worth eting in ful, for describes most precisely this process of subtraction Wit fle sruples he Freud asks, How are we to explain the fat that tere ate fey sor seven wolves in this eam?

The wots wl have to be purged of thee multipiciy. Taree wolves: the pent ay have made love thee times. What is real isthe becoming itself Who's Afraid of Hegelian Wolves? Becoming i not a hesitation between the abyseal vertigo of absence of form and the security of a particular incarnation.

In fact Ahab finds in the whale a death which is not thet, fof his genus, which dors not lead him back, in other words, 0 the Beneric universality that he is supposed to have sprung from. Neither the totem, the fetish, nor any discoune of amorphosis can exhaust the complexity of such a symbiosis. There ae laws of ature that exceed the les of 3re tothe extent that they cannot be described or classified.

Their meeting a fortuitous contagion, not a Glia ction. Edhology Allows one to take account of what cannot be calculated in living beings. The logic of relations between the indivi tnd generic essence are completely incapable of explaining it Deleuze and Guattari measure this power or eapacity for mprow tion in molecules, or in particles.

An assemblage with other bodies takes place alr line of fight dhrough which a body escapes from itself fom its f Who's Afraid of Hegelian Wetees? Thus stability is assured in catastrophe by a barrier. The individ tale forming a pack have no generic or specific community and tannot, from thie point of view, become the object of «taxonomy, Moreover a multiplicity is not defined by the elements or characters composing it, but rather by the arrangements of affects that i forms, Given that, the anomalous carries only affects it not, a8 such, subjectivity, an offspring, a child; perhaps it does not even have a sex.

Its figure and function are unpredictable, its position un liable itis restricted to stabilizing the pack in a merely temporary id local manner, directing without any logic wansformations oe ges of multiplicities: the exceptional individual is but line of us now come back o the Hegel whose thinking is not supposed to account of becoming in any real sense, any more than it does the enomenon ofthe exceptional individual, Let us return to him who, seems, has never encountered the pack.

Precisely this, as I suggested easier: that unity by subtraction and ity by exception compose one with the other ina fundamental, ner; that in trying to think one without the other, i eying to inst the second as the truth concerning the pack, one overlooks the pack the very point where one claims to he following it. As a result the kreassembles, in spite of itself, in the most traditional igure of ity there is: becomes Go.

Its siculation, The pack can self-destruct; it can also constitute" new clin, an active lin tat will bring other bocomings' ATP The becoming of the pack is unpredictable: it fongs t the order ofthe secre. Acer into Delete the pack i ot evar ofthe negnive. Inasmuch asthe organi can be ulped ar fo neni or intense of energy. Clery, in Hep bait completely ced toa tecogy and te lope of temo but it would now be pombe to show tha elelogy, fe fom Spending the economy of mul, stead brings abot.

I Shall bezin by recalling Deleuze's analysis of the fundamental role Dlayed by habit within the ving being. Infact itis habit that allows the individ al to become singularized, 2 genus all to itell.

On the one Band it means contemplation: itis only by seeing, and ths by subjecting oneself tothe action of the sensible, that vision is achieved. On the other hand it means action: iis i fact by the same process of subjection, paradoxically, thatthe eye is formed. What takes place in terms of habit is «reduction in receptivity and an increase in Fpontancity. The progressive development ofan internal activity x plains the progressive decrease in passivity.

Actions that are repeated, lover and over reach a higher and higher level of sufficiency and the being familiares itself with their circumstances. As a result habit, sppears atthe same ime as what disciplines the pack and what frees it from affect One is struck by the fact that, in the Philbsophy of Nanure, Hegel develops a problematic of habit that is very close ro that of Deleuze.

The organic living thing, a I shall establish by following Hegel's analyses, is itself a reduction and a condensation of the elements ofits malie: water, ai, nitrogen end carbon molecules.

In the fst place habit signifies this power of contraction. The result of such e contraction actually creates the habizus that i to sy te internal disposition and general constita- tion of the organism. This leads me in turn to observe that every mechanism of adapration of the living things aleady itself a type af therein, according tothe double sense of that term developed by Aristotle, namely contemplation and exercise In fact Hegel also shows how the living organism contracts within itself the wery things t derives from: inert matter, elements, chemical processes, etc, all the constitative moments that are dialecically Tinked inthe Philosophy of Nature.

Ia the animal, this elation already appears a subjectivity. The fact that the repetition of changes produces diference in the subject experiencing it, means that change coming from the exterior i gradually wansformed into a change coming from within the organism itself, savolving the body in the Becoming of is singularity Impressions lose their force as they reproduce.

One gets inured against external sensations frost, beat, weariness of the limbs, ete, sweet tastes, te There is indif- ference tovrards the satisfaction: the desies and impulses are by the habit of their satisfaction deadened. Ie annot st up is singu larity at a universal and erase the disproportion between them.

By means ofits double and contradictory functions, vitalizing and thanatologial, abit in Hegel traces a path within the telos.

In his work multiplicity rot systematically and violently reduced to a unity, it abbreviates, Teelf and sbbrevition is the necessary wearing out that resrains the pack, holds i in check, suspends its infinite becoming.

In several senses. This rigidity is the Uislecrcal emergence of quality by means of reduction ofthe pho- Who's Afraid of Hegelian Weles? So nity by abbreviation sppeat asthe median wy between ui recon and nity by compu. The pens of tang soot berated rom themscie. They remain potently rich gol: tive multipicy and intenny.

Malabou is someone else altogether. In jumping back and forth, Malabou keeps Deleuze and Hegel apart. At another time, I want to return to this passage but presently I report it as the thematic pin that binds Deleuze, here in DR to Hegel in Philosophy of Nature. There is a convincing logic, here, one that locates a similar dynamic within the two thinkers. The import of this dynamic, I will have to explore later. An unusual relation?

Perhaps a lack in precision is necessary in order to retain its power to provoke. This entry was posted on March 11, at am and is filed under Uncategorized.

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You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account. Notify me of new comments via email. Notify me of new posts via email. Holland, Ronald Bogue, and Timothy S. The pieces in this collection address various Deleuzian interests and projects, covering his interpretations of Kant, Spinoza, Bergson, and Melville; his theoretical discussions of mathematics, ethics, and aesthetics; and also his best-known work, the collaborative texts written with the psychoanalyst Felix Guattari.

It helps to come to this collection with a working vocabulary and knowledge of what has been called the "exuberance—and exorbitance" of Deleuze's thought. Understanding concepts occurring in his philosophy such as faciality, virtuality, haecceity, types of becoming, and rhizome, to name just a few of the terms that come up in this reader, is invaluable background to finding entry points into some of the issues under examination here.

Similarly, and of particular import with at least three of these essays, it is beneficial to know that for this philosopher, "Ahab's strange relationship with Moby Dick, mixing desire with death, is, since Dialogues , the example of becoming that Deleuze most frequently provides" Zourabichvili, p. To read Martin's essay, "The Eye of the Outside," for instance, without this knowledge would make the connections in this, the second piece in the collection, appear to be non-sequiturs.

Martin's essay begins by extrapolating from Deleuze's The Movement Image an analogy to Foucault, Melville, and finally Neitzsche to construct an argument about perspective, surface, and concept that reaches such conclusions as "this rolled back eye comes up against the frontier of bone, against the empty whiteness, the deadly intermittence of visibility that it ceaselessly transgresses, as though it everywhere encountered an uncrossable border which ran between all the images" pp.

In other words, many of the essays in this aggregation do not serve the unitiated Deleuzian reader well; as Martin's piece illustrates, some of these writings have a tendency to bewilder rather than to elucidate.



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